Centaurs of the mind : Imagination and Fiction-making in the Work of Fulke Greville by Sierhuis, Freya
This is a repository copy of Centaurs of the mind : Imagination and Fiction-making in the 
Work of Fulke Greville.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/152509/
Version: Published Version
Book Section:
Sierhuis, Freya orcid.org/0000-0001-5344-2118 (2018) Centaurs of the mind : Imagination 
and Fiction-making in the Work of Fulke Greville. In: Leo, Russ, Roeder, Katrin and 
Sierhuis, Freya, (eds.) Fulke Greville and the Literary Culture of the English Renaissance. 
Oxford University Press , pp. 99-118. 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Dictionary: NOSD
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 13/07/18, SPi
6
Centaurs of the Mind
Imagination and Fiction-making  
in the Work of Fulke Greville
Freya Sierhuis
he appreciation of the erotic poetry of Caelica has been slow to catch up with the 
gradual revival of interest in the work of Fulke Greville. hom Gunn’s 1968 anthol-
ogy of Greville’s poetry presented an eloquent case for the emotional power and 
perspicacity of Greville’s love lyric. Yet where the poet of Boss Cupid could see ways 
in which the love poetry of an Elizabethan courtier might speak to a modern audience 
directly, literary critics have tended to approach Greville’s erotic poetry through 
comparison either to Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella, or to the religious poetry that 
dominates the last part of the sequence. Greville’s editor Bullough, who recognized 
the underlying unity of thought within the cycle, nevertheless viewed its progress 
as one of development over time that bore witness to the growth of the poet’s 
mind.1 To his credit, Bullough recognized the charm and originality of the love poetry. 
Of the anti-Petrarchist poems he writes, a touch primly perhaps: ‘Of humour 
he has plenty in Caelica, though of a brusque, ironic, even sardonic playfulness 
which must have been somewhat disconcerting to the ladies he courted’, while the 
Anacreontics are described as ‘delightful’.2
Few critics have followed Bullough’s lead. he double comparison between 
Sidney and Greville, and between ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ Greville, has adversely afected 
the love poetry by insisting on what it isn’t, rather than what it is; neither as luent 
and musical as the poetry of Sidney, nor as urgent and powerful as the religious 
poems.3 his view tends to circumscribe Greville’s literary accomplishment within 
1 Bullough, 37, 49. 2 Bullough, 23.
3 ‘he love poems show him imitating Sidney’s rhetorical method and failing as often as he suc-
ceeded. Again, out of failure came discovery of his limits and of a method appropriate to his gifts’, 
Ronald A. Rebholz, 50–67, 59; More subtle, and more sensitive towards the consonance between 
Greville’s poetics and epistemology is David A. Roberts, ‘Fulke Greville’s Aesthetic Reconsidered’, 
SP 74.4 (1977): 388–405. While I share elements of Roberts’ interpretation, one of the aims of this 
present chapter is to challenge the division of Caelica in early, middle, and late poems. For an analysis of 
Greville’s ideas on metaphoric language, see June Dwyer, ‘Fulke Greville’s Aesthetic: Another Perspective’, 
SP 78.3 (1981): 255–74; SP 74.4 (1977): 388–405. Similar views can be found in Tom W.N. Parker’s 
Proportional Form in the Sonnets of the Sidney Circle: Loving in Truth (Oxford; 1998), ch. 2 ‘Fulke Greville 
and Proportional Form: Caelica in Manuscript and Print’. An exception is Waswo, 42–72.
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what Greville’s biographer Rebholz described as a poetic style deined through 
limitation, an interpretation often explained via an appeal to Greville’s comparison 
between his own ‘images of life’ and Sidney’s ‘images of wit’ in he Dedication to 
Sir Philip Sidney .4 he established view of Greville as a philosophical and religious 
poet can accommodate the critique of the hypocrisies of courtly love found in 
some of the Myra and Cynthia poems but is decidedly less comfortable with the 
playful eroticism of ‘Away with these self-loving lads’ and ‘Faction which ever dwells’ 
or the abrasive, openly sexual satire of ‘All my sense like Beacons lame’. his more 
playful, sensual, and whimsical streak in Greville’s poetry comes across strongly in 
the songbook adaptations of Dowland and Cavendish. Even Martin Peerson’s 
memorial volume Mottects or Grave Chamber Music (1630), in which the more 
serious poetry predominates, includes two of the Anacreontics, Caelica XXV and 
XXVI. he nymphs and shepherds of the bucolic poems share their environment 
with a gathering of ephemeral creatures from English mythology and fairy-lore, 
including sorcerers, sprites, and Robin Goodfellows (Caelica V, XXI, XXIII, XXXI, L). 
he intrusion of the igure of Robin Goodfellow, a type of mischievous domestic 
sprite also known as a puck or a brownie, into the narrative of Caelica holds 
particular fascination.5 While written earlier than Midsummer Night’s Dream, the 
creatures inhabiting Greville’s pastoral poetry nevertheless belong to the same 
imaginative world. he sprites and Goodfellows of Caelica are perhaps closer to 
the world of folklore than the fairies of Oberon’s court, yet they share the same 
lineage, and hold a similar function. hey graft the games and gambles of courtly 
love within a bucolic setting associated with an older popular-festive culture of 
May dances, harvest games, and fairy-lore, just as they fuse the literary forms of 
Anacreontic and Ovidian imitation with that of the fabliau and the popular proverb. 
Yet the leeting appearances of these half-world creatures also serve to draw our 
attention to the ambivalent nature of love. In this context, it is interesting to note 
that the name Robin Goodfellow crops up in association with Greville’s persona as 
a courtier and a ladies’ man. As Bacon recounts in an anecdote from the Apophthegms:
Sir Fulke Greville had much and private access to Queen Elizabeth which he used 
honourably and did many men good. Yet he would say merrily of himself that he was 
like Robin Goodfellow; for when the maids spilt the milk pans or kept any racket, 
they would lay it upon Robin: so what tales the ladies about the Queen told her, or 
other bad oices that they did, they would put it upon him.6
One can discern in this leeting glimpse something elusive, yet nevertheless bearing 
an undeniable ainity with the imaginative world of Caelica. For, despite his 
menial role and tasks, Robin Goodfellow, the son of a mortal woman and a ‘Hee-
fairy’ in some accounts, shares some of the uncanny traits of his fairy cousins.7 
‘Sweet Robin’, who rewards hard work and warrants the principle of fairness and 
4 Dedication, ch. 18, 134.
5 K.M. Briggs, he Anatomy of Puck. An Examination of Fairy Beliefs among Shakespeare’s 
Contemporaries and Successors (London: Routledge, 1959), 25f, 40f, 47, 59, 71, 75f, 84, 85, 93.
6 Rebholz, 54.
7 Anon., Robin Goodfellow, His Mad Pranks and Merry Iests (1639), A4r–v.
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reciprocity in all transactions, erotic or otherwise, is equally a trickster; a detached, 
cold-eyed observer, who deals merriment and menace in equal measure. In 
Shakespeare’s Midsummer Night’s Dream, Mary-Ellen Lamb has observed, Puck 
comes to resemble Cupid, yet in Greville’s Caelica, it is Cupid who resembles a 
puck, a hobgoblin, or a sprite.8
Compared to Sidney’s Cupid, who is usually portrayed as an infant, or as a help-
less little boy, disarmed by Stella’s virtue, Greville’s ‘sweet boy’ is more wily and 
mischievous. ‘Cupid’, Bradin Cormack writes, ‘is Greville’s great igure of desire’s 
swerves and complexities.’9 In other words, Cupid is the igure through which 
Greville explores the dynamic of desire, imagination, and erotic ixation. he love 
poetry which scrutinizes the relationship between the mistress and the lover in 
terms of projection and fetishization, on closer inspection turn out to share the 
same philosophical grounds as the poems which examine the mechanisms of spiritual 
slavery later in the cycle. Some poems, such as Caelica XXXIX which, in uniquely 
Grevillean manner, employs the word ‘to babylon’ as a verb, explicate the link 
between courtly love and idolatry
he pride of lesh by reach of humane witt,
Did purpose once to over-reach the skye 
And where before God dround the world for it, 
Yet Babylon it built upp, not to dye,
God knewe these fools how foolishlie they wrought
hat destiny with pollicie would breake, 
Straight none could tell his fellow what he thought
heir tongues were changed, and men not taught to speake
Soe I that heavenlie peace would comprehend, 
In mortal seate of Caelica’s faire hart, 
To Babylon myself, there did intend, 
With natural kindness, and with passions art, 
But when I thought my self of her self free, 
All’s chang’d; shee understands all men but mee.
Caelica XXXIX is one of the many in the sequence that deal with disillusionment, 
where satire, encapsulated in the closing couplet’s throwaway accusation of ‘carnal 
knowledge’, shadows a deeper philosophical and religious point. he irst line, ‘he 
pride of lesh by reach of human wit’, aligns the poem with the exegetical tradition 
going back to Augustine’s City of God, which interprets the story of the building of 
the Tower of Babel as a key episode in the continuing struggle between pride and 
humility.10 Viewed this way, the poem parodies the confusion of languages by setting 
8 Mary Ellen Lamb, ‘Taken by the Fairies: Fairy Practices and the Production of Popular Culture 
in A Midsummer Night’s Dream’, Shakespeare Quarterly 51.3 (2000): 277–312.
9 Bradin Cormack, ‘In the Labyrinth: Gunn’s Greville’, Gunn, 161–77, 170; On the representa-
tion of Cupid as a boy, see Tom McFaul, ‘he Childish Love of Philip Sidney and Fulke Greville’, 
SJ 24.2 (2006): 37–65.
10 Augustine, he City of God against the Pagans, Volume V: Books 16–18.35 translated by 
Eva M. Sanford and William M. Green, LCL 415 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 
XVI.4, pp 24–31. Idolatry as spiritual fornication is of course a frequent metaphor in the Old 
Testament; see 2 Chron. 21:13; Jer. 3:2, 3:9, 13:27, Eze. 16:17 and passim.
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the lover and his lady at odds over the meaning of the verb to understand. he con-
ceit of the tower in the heart, which simultaneously evokes the inner architectonics 
of the heart of Petrarchan lyric, and the sensual language of the Song of Songs, 
alarmingly juxtaposes intimacy, hubris, and danger; erotic disappointment, and 
salvation history. he evocation of Canticles, like a faint echo, guides the reader to 
a similar moment of parataxis in the Book of Revelation, where after the destruc-
tion of Babylon, ‘with whom the kings of the earth have committed fornication’, 
an angelic voice calls out: ‘And the light of candle shall shine no more at all in thee; 
and the voice of the Bridegroom and of the Bride shall be hear no more at all in 
thee: for thy merchants were the great men of the earth; for by thy sorceries were 
all nations deceived.’ (Rev.19. 23)
PHANTASIA AND  IMAGINATIO  
IN EARLY MODERN CULTURE
Yet iconoclastic satire is only part of Greville’s gambit. Rather, these poems chart 
the subtle ways in which the imagination entraps us in nets of our own making. In 
analysing the workings of the imagination, the poems operate within a wider con-
troversy within philosophy, poetics, and faculty psychology on the powers of the 
imaginative faculty.11 he imagination occupied a highly fraught space within 
early modern culture as the locus of conlicting, often irreconcilable claims, which 
tended to highlights its dangers, as well as its powers, and its inescapable role in 
cognition.12 Greville’s poetry indexes these contradictory impulses and makes 
them philosophically productive in a way that is unique within the tradition of 
English Petrarchist love lyric.
Early modern ideas about the imagination did not form a coherent body of 
thought, but rather constituted an amalgamation of Aristotelian, Platonic and 
Neoplatonic, Galenic, and Scholastic ideas. Medieval and early modern medical 
science and moral philosophy had always been acutely aware of the imagination’s 
liability to distortion and error. In the tradition of Scholastic commentaries on 
Aristotle’s De anima, the imagination was seen to occupy a crux within the percep-
tual chain between sense perception and intellection, acting as the drawing bridge 
between the body and soul. According to this schema, sense perceptions would be 
conveyed through the species, minute simulacra omitted by external objects, which 
11 hroughout this chapter, I use ‘imagination’ where early modern people would have diferentiated 
between imaginatio; the part of the imaginative faculty closely allied to sense perception and the sensus 
communis, and fantasia, or fantasy, the part responsible for the assembling and manipulation of mental 
images that works independently from sense perception. While this distinction is by no means system-
atically maintained, ‘fantasy’ tends to be reserved for the imagination’s creative capacity.
12 Murray Wright Bundy, he heory of the Imagination in Classical and Medieval hought (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1971 [1928]); William Rossky, ‘Imagination in the English Renaissance: 
Psychology and Poetic’, in Studies in the Renaissance, Volume 5 (1958), 49–73; Lodi Nauta and Detlev 
Pätzold, eds, Imagination in the Later Middle Ages and Early Modern Times (Leuven: Peeters, 2004); 
John D. Lyons, Before Imagination: Embodied hought from Montaigne to Rousseau (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2005).
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travel through the medium of the air, striking the optic nerve and from there being 
conveyed to the sensus communis, or common sense, the irst ventricle of the brain. 
he sensus communis sorts these impressions, and passes them on to the  imagination 
and then to the fantasy, where the impressions are collated and assembled into 
phantasmata, which are passed on to the memory for storage and evaluation.13 
Because the irst step in this process, the transformation of sense impression into 
mental images or representations is physiological, the imagination was seen to be 
particularly prone to the body’s disruptive impulses, liable to disease, humoral sur-
feit, and demonic infection, caused by the devil’s ability to distort the form of the 
species, or manipulate the shape of the phantasmata.14
From the fourteenth century onwards, cracks started to appear in the complex 
ediice of medieval faculty psychology. he existence of the species began to be 
called into question. he indings of anatomical investigation appeared to disprove 
the existence of ventricles in the brain. As a result, the place of the imagination in 
the cognitive process began to lose its stable moorings. During the ifteenth and 
sixteenth century, moreover, developments in the science of perspective, in optics 
and epistemology led, as Stuart Clark has shown in Vanities of the Eye, to increasing 
concerns about the fallibility of the mechanisms of mental representation, and the 
potential lack of correspondence between external objects and the images gener-
ated by the imagination.15 From the sixteenth century onwards, there is a tendency 
to dispense with the idea of separate mental faculties, in favour of a unitary model 
of the soul. his search for an undivided soul perhaps explains to some extent the 
increasing attractiveness of alternative models of the soul or mind, such as those 
provided by Stoicism. Stoic phantasia does in fact draw into its remit most mental 
operations including perception, dreams, and more generally the movements of 
consciousness.16 his inluence of Stoic epistemology has been traced in the work of 
Montaigne, whose account of the role of the imagination in an essay such as ‘De la 
force de l’imagination’ and ‘De l’inconstance de noz actions’ emphasize its way-
wardness, vanity, and inconstancy, and yet accords it an absolutely crucial role in 
human thought and action.17 Pierre Charron’s De la Sagesse, translated into English 
by Samson Lennard in 1608, is not uncharacteristic in its prevaricating between a 
unitary and a composite theory of the soul, when describing the imagination as 
‘either the onley, or at least the most active and stirring faculty of the soule’.18 One 
thing is certain, though: for Charron, and for many others with him, the power of 
13 Olaf Pluta, ‘On the Matter of the Mind. Late Medieval Views on Mind, Body and Imagination’, 
in Imagination, ed. Nauta and Pätzold, 21–33; Matthew Milner, he Senses and the English Reformation 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), ch. 1, ‘he senses and sensing in ifteenth century England’, 13–51.
14 See Angus Gowland, ‘Melancholy, Imagination, and Dreaming in Renaissance Learning’, in 
Diseases of the Imagination and Imaginary Disease in Early Modern Europe, ed. Yasmin Haskell (Brepols: 
Turnhout, 2012), 53–102.
15 Stuart Clark, Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern Culture (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), ‘Introduction’, 1–9, 2.
16 Cocking, Imagination, 23.
17 On Stoicism in Montaigne’s account of the imagination, see Lyons, Before Imagination, ch. 1, 
‘he Return of Stoic Imagination’, 32–60.
18 Pierre Charron, Of Wisdom hree Bookes Written by Pierre Charron, Doctor of Lawe in Paris, 
trans. Samson Lennard (London: Printed for Edward Blount & Witt Aspley), 54.
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the imagination was vast, and somewhat terrifying: ‘he imagination is a thing 
very strong, very powerful, it is that makes all the stirre, all the clatter, yea the 
 perturbation of the world proceeds from it’.19
In early modern England, such concerns were compounded by the revitalization 
of the ancient debate on the role of images in religious worship brought about by 
Reformation. Hostility towards the worship of images, most immediately associ-
ated with the Lollards, did in fact characterize much of late medieval high 
 theology.20 During the sixteenth century, it was one of the attitudes shared by 
many reformers who otherwise held radically diferent views, such as Erasmus, 
Andreas Karlstadt, Martin Bucer, and John Calvin.
he rejection of images forms a continuous sub-current in Western Christianity 
that emerged to the surface with varying force and destructiveness at diferent 
moments in history. Even so, the iconoclastic controversy of mid- and late  sixteenth 
century nevertheless constituted a particularly vehement lare-up of this ancient 
controversy. Margaret Aston’s England’s Iconoclasts has drawn to two particular 
developments in the controversy about images which, I believe, form an essential 
background to Greville’s poetic thinking about the idols of the mind. Aston notes 
how, following the destruction and removal of images from the churches during 
the reigns of Edward VI and Elizabeth I, the closing decades of the sixteenth 
century witnessed an increasing concern with the dangers of mental idolatry: ‘From 
an initial concern with image making (the fantasies of the mind) as part of the pro-
duction of external images, the puriiers became focused on the errors of mental 
images per se’.21 William Perkins, whose voluminous A Warning of the Idolatrie of 
the Last Times systematizes the Reformed polemic against images, draws attention 
to the connection between idolatry and the mechanisms of mental representation: 
Any image made with the purpose of worshipping God, or representing him, 
Perkins argues, is an idol. Responding the question of why it is not lawful to rep-
resent God in the way in which we conceive him in the mind, Perkins explains:
I answer, the right way to conceive god is not to conceive any form: but to conceive in 
minde his properties and proper efects. So soone as the minde frames unto itself any 
forme of God (as when he is popishly conceived to be like an old man sitting in a 
throne with a scepter in his hand) an idol is set up in the mind.22
God is a spiritual being and can therefore not be represented in material form. 
hese ideas are in no way particularly new or original: large parts of Perkins’  treatise 
19 Ibid.
20 Margaret Aston, Lollards and Reformers. Images and Literacy in Late Medieval Religion (London: 
he Hambledon Press, 1984); Matthew Dimmock, James Simpson, and Nicolette Zeeman, eds, 
Images, Idolatry and Iconoclasm in Late Medieval England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
introduction and ch. 6, ‘Et que est huius ydoli materia? Tuipse: Idols and Images in Walter Hilton’; 
and Carlos M.N. Eire, War against the Idols. he Reformation of Worship from Erasmus to Calvin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
21 Margaret Aston, England’s Iconoclasts, vol. I, Laws against Images (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1988), 458–9. See also Clark, Vanities of the Eye, ch. 5, ‘Images: he Reformation of the Eyes’, 161–235.
22 William Perkins, A Warning against the Idolatry of the Last Times, And an instruction touching 
religious or divine worship (London: John Leggat 1616), 27.
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draw directly on the writings of the Church Fathers, referring frequently to works 
such as Tertullian’s De spectaculis and De idolatria; Origin’s Contra Celsum and 
Augustine’s De civitate Dei; De vera religione; De doctrina christiana, De haeresibus 
ad Quodvultdeum, and the Ennarationes in Psalmos. One can nevertheless argue 
that the continuing polemic on the status of images between Reformed authors 
and the Catholic, mostly Jesuit opponents, contributed to the increasing focus in 
Reformed writing on the dangers of representation as such. In result, the distinc-
tion, irst made by Origin, between the eidolon, a representation of something 
without prototype in nature, such as for instance a centaur, and an eikon, deined 
as a mimetic image of an existing thing or object, and still maintained in the earlier 
controversial works on image worship, such as Karlstadt’s Von Abtuhung der Bilder 
(1522), which distinguishes images (Bilder) from idols (Götze), came increasingly 
under pressure.23 Whereas the defenders of images tended to uphold the validity 
of the distinction between idol and images, Reformed Protestant literature increas-
ingly tended towards the elision of the diference between the two.
he problem was in part one of translation and interpretation: while the word 
eidolatria does not igure in the Septuagint, the Hebrew Old Testament counted 
no less than thirty words which the Septuagint and Vulgate rendered as eidolon, 
idolum, or simulacrum.24 Yet for Lancelot Andrewes, the crucial distinction 
between Reformed and Catholic on this point centered on the meaning of the 
 disputed word pesel. It had, Andrews argued, a broader signiicance than either 
eikon or eidolon, and indicated ‘any kind of conception or imagination which may 
arise’.25 ‘When a new doctrine is divised’, Perkins maintained, quoting Jerome, 
‘an idol is set up in the hearts and souls of believers. A false opinion is an idol of 
falsehood’.26 Biblical scholarship and the pressure of confessional polemic com-
bined resulted in an increasingly forceful denial of the distinction between idol and 
image. he insistence on the radical transcendence of God exposed a chasm 
between Creator and creation that threatened to engulf the very possibility of rep-
resenting or imagining the deity. As the boundaries of the idea of representation 
shifted, any form of representational thought was perceived to expose the believer 
to the dangers of idolatry.
his suspicion of the mind’s habit of thinking through images may strike the 
reader as incongruous with the commonly held assumption in the Aristotelian and 
scholastic tradition of psychology, that all thinking involved images, involved mental 
representation of some sort. he distrust of the imagination’s image-making 
capacity derived, however, from a tributary tradition based on Augustine’s discus-
sion of the faculty in book twelve of De Genesi ad litteram, which inluenced the 
subsequent accounts in Aquinas’s Summa heologiae (1a.78.4; Ia.84.6–7; I a.90.1), 
and Dante’s La Vita Nova.27Augustine’s innovation was to accord the will a central 
23 Aston, England’s Iconoclasts, 398. 24 Aston, England’s Iconoclasts, 398.
25 Aston, England’s Iconoclasts, 393.
26 Perkins, A Warning against the Idolatrie of the Last Times, 15.
27 Augustine, he Literal Meaning of Genesis, trans. John Hammond Taylor S.J., II vols. Ancient 
Christian Writers. he Work of the Fathers in Translation no. 42 (New York: Newman Press, 1982), 
Volume 2, XII, 178–231. An extensive discussion of Augustine’s views on the imagination can 
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place in his discussion of the imagination. he will and the intellect conjointly 
share the task of safeguarding the correspondence between the image in the mind 
and its external object. Yet more often than not these guardians fail in their duty, 
turning the products of the imagination into a fountain of error, self-deception, 
and libidinous distraction. Augustine’s account of the imagination is shaped by 
what, in fact, is intentionality: the way we bring our own attention to bear upon 
the objects of consciousness. As J.M. Cocking argues:
Augustine recognizes that wat we see depends to some extent on what we are looking 
for, and that if we are looking for something with enough desire, or ‘vehemence’, we 
shall mistake our self-created image for the real thing, and give rise to hallucinations 
or bodily reactions identical with those that would take place of the image were real 
and not ictional.28
It is because of the imagination’s fatal imbrication in the will and the afections that 
its creations carry the risk of sweeping the soul away in a torrent of sin and error. 
he scholastic tradition, rooted in the theology of the Dominican order, with its 
contrast to the Augustians’ more positive evaluation of the faculties of fallen man, 
tends to give less emphasis to the imagination’s waywardness and its alliance with 
the corrupt afections and will. In the work of the sixteenth century Reformers, 
whose work witnessed a renewal of interest in Augustine’s psychology of original 
sin, the emphasis on the corrupt imagination is once more given stark relief. From 
the imagination, Calvin argues in the Institutes of the Christian Religion, proceeds:
that immense lood of error with which the whole world is overlowed. Every indi-
vidual mind being a kind of labyrinth, it is not wonderful not only that each nation 
has adopted a variety of ictions, but that almost every man has his own God. To the 
darkness of ignorance have been added presumption and wantonness, and hence there 
is scarcely and individual to be found without some idol or phantom as a substitute 
for the Deity.29
Because of the depravity of our afections, our imaginations are always and 
 inevitably corrupt. In the Treatie of Human Learning, Greville thus argues: ‘his 
power besides, always cannot receive/ What sense reports, but what th’afections 
please’, to conclude:
So must th’Imagination from the sense
Be misinformed, while our afections cast 
False shapes, and forms on their intelligence, 
To keep out true intromission thence, 
be  found in Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (London: Duckworth, 1987), ch. 4, 
‘Imagination’, 106–30. St homas Aquinas, Summa heologiae, 60 Volumes, Volume 11–13, Man, 
edited by Timothy Suttor (London: Blackfriars/Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1963–1975), Volume 11 
(1970), 137–43; Volume 12 (1968), 32–43; Volume 13 (1964), 2–7; On the inluence of De Genesi 
ad litteram on later theories of the imagination, see Allan D. Fitzgerald, O.S.A, ed., Augustine through 
the Ages. An Encyclopedia (William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999), 442–3.
28 J.M. Cocking, Imagination. A Study in the History of an Idea (London: Routledge, 1990), 74.
29 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, John T. McNeill, ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1960), I.5.12, 23.
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abstracts the imagination or distasts, 
With images preoccupately plac’d
Hence our desires, feares, hopes, love, hate, and sorrow, 
In fancy make us heare, feele, see impressions, 
Such as out of our sense they do not borrow; 
And are the eicient cause, the true progression 
Of sleeping visions, idle phantasms waking 
Life, dreames; and knowledge, apparitions making.
(HL, 12–13)30
hese stanzas demonstrate Greville’s careful application of the terminology of 
 faculty psychology, with its distinction between the imagination and the fantasy as 
two separate parts of the imaginative capacity of the mind. Greville’s choice of 
words, however, signals yet another, additional set of intellectual concerns which 
have less to do with the corruption of the will which preoccupied Church fathers 
and Reformers, and more with the forms of undisciplined, unreformed reasoning 
someone like Francis Bacon blamed for the lack of progress in human learning. For 
Bacon, the imagination’s unruly tendencies are directly linked to the theory of the 
idols of the mind. In De augmentis scientiarum, Bacon describes how the senses 
convey images (idola) to the imagination, which are then processed by memory 
and reason. he idols of the mind, in turn, are described as either false images 
(imagines) or as notions that are ‘corrupt, disordered, and recklessly abstracted 
from things’. Abstraction here is the term for the imagination’s light away from 
the particulars of experience, towards the generalities and principles of things.31 
Greville’s description for the situation in which true impressions have been 
‘crowded out’ by false ones strikes a similarly Baconian note. In fact, ‘preoccupation’ 
is Bacon’s term for the state in which the mind rests in false notions and no longer 
pursues inquiry.32 As Sorana Coreanu and Koen Vermeir have argued, Bacon’s 
account of cognition in De augmentis scientiarum shows the inluence of Stoicism, 
which awards the imagination a central part in all cognitive processes.33 Stoic epis-
temology viewed the cognitive process as the reception image-like imprint (fanta-
sia) in the material soul, to which it gives assent (synkathesis). Concerning the mind’s 
action in judging, Bacon writes, ‘the same action of the mind which  discovers the 
thing in question judges it; and the operation is not performed by help of any middle 
term, but directly, almost in the same manner as by the sense.’34
A similar coniguration one inds in Greville, particularly in his Neostoic epistle 
of comfort, the Letter to an Honourable Lady.35 In this work, Greville does not so 
much as set out to console his addressee, as to embark on the destruction of her 
30 Wilkes. All references are to this edition.
31 ‘the mind longs to leap up to higher generalities to. and rest there; and after a short while scorns 
experience’, Novum Organon, in: he Oxford Francis Bacon, Volume 11: he Instauratio magna Part II: 
Novum organum and Associated Texts, ed. Graham Rees and Maria Wakely (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2004), I, xx, 71.
32 Sorana Coreanu and Koen Vermeir, ‘Idols of the Imagination: Francis Bacon on the Imagination 
and the Medicine of the Mind’, Perspectives on Science 20.2 (2012): 183–206, 193.
33 Coreanu and Vermeir, ‘Idols of the Imagination’, 186–8.
34 Coreanu and Vermeir, ‘Idols of the Imagination’, 187.
35 Letter to an Honourable Lady, Gouws.
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illusions, a project he likens, brutally, to the demolition of a ruined house that is 
threatening to fall down on its owner.36 he ruins are the lady’s hopes, thoughts, 
and plans to improve her situation or her marriage; all illusions that can be traced 
back to the two dominant passions of hope and fear.37 For Greville, the passions, 
which he deines, following Cicero, as diseases of the mind, are the source of 
 cognitive error, erroneous value judgements that leads us out of ourselves and into 
the world, giving ourselves over to fortune.38 ‘Beleeve therefore, with the wise; that 
betweene mistie objects, and more mistie senses, many things doe rather terriie 
than oppress; and so force frail mankinde to labor more in opinion, than in thinges’.39 
Rather than relying on any external aid, she must learn to depend on her own 
powers, realizing the only freedom that can truly be called such is the mind’s power 
over its own thoughts and afections, or what Greville calls ‘a calm and calming 
mens adepta.40 he inal part of the Letter, however, signals the move away from 
Stoic ethics towards the need for divine grace, showing how even the idea of Stoic 
self-suiciency is, ultimately, a iction, albeit a relatively harmless one.41 Stoicism 
and Calvinism are contiguous, rather than, as is sometimes maintained, mutually 
exclusive: in thinking about the imagination, Greville’s Stoicism merely serves to 
place an additional epistemological challenge unto the burden of the lesh.42
When it comes to the analysis of the psychological mechanism of afective 
intentionality, it makes no diference whether our idol is a woman, or a false con-
ception of God: our passions and ‘wit’, the part of the rational mind most closely 
allied with the imagination, ‘infect’ our perceptions, corrupting and distorting the 
images constructed by the fantasy:
But our inirmitie, which cannot brooke
his strong, intestine, and rebelliouse warre, 
In wit and our afections make us looke 
For such Religions as there imag’d are: 
Hence grow these manie worships, Gods, and sects, 
Wherewith man’s error all the world infects
For when the Conscience thus Religion fashions 
In blinde afections, there it straight begetts 
Grosse superstition; when in wittie passions 
It moulded is, a lustre there it setts 
On hearts prophane, by politique pretense; 
Both buying shadows with the soules expence
(TR, 16–17)
he language of imaginative infection and contagion can be found in Bacon, 
and yet the emphasis here lies, perhaps, more strongly on the way afective sense 
36 Letter, Gouws, cap. 3, 150. 37 Letter, Gouws, cap. 4, 156–7.
38 Letter, Gouws, cap. 5, 169–70, compare Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, ed. and trans. J.E. King 
(London: Heinemann, 1927), 402.
39 Letter, Gouws, cap. 4, 161. 40 Letter, Gouws, cap. 5, 170.
41 Letter, Gouws, cap. 6, 172–6.
42 On the compatibility of Stoicism and Calvinist ethics, see Christoph Strohm, Ethik im frühen 
Calvinismus.Humanistische Einlüsse, philosophische, juristische und theologische Argumentationen sowie 
Mentalitätgeschichtliche Aspekte am Beispiel des Calvin Schulers Lambert Danaeus (Berlin/New York: 
De Gruyter, 1996), Part III ‘Wirkungen des Stoarenaissance in Ethices Libri III’, 116–93.
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perception allows original sin to be ‘taken’ from the world and communicated back 
into it: ‘Fleshe the foundation is, fancie the worke/ Where rak’d up, and unquencht 
the evills lurke.’ (TR, 22) his inevitably raises the question of how, when we 
 cannot form an adequate conception of God, we can be sure to know him: ‘hen 
by afecting powre we cannot know him,/ By knowing all thinges else we know 
him lesse;/ Nature containes him not, Art cannot show him,/ Opinions, idolles, 
and not God expresse’ (TR, 6). he remaining sparks of natural religiosity which 
remain even in fallen humanity will spur the creature to seek out its Creator, yet 
looking into itself, it inds only remnants of the divine image, distorted almost 
beyond recognition. In this way, the Law functions as a mirror: ‘in it, we contem-
plate our weakness, then the iniquity arising from this, and inally the curse 
coming from both—just as a mirror shows us the spots on our face’.43 In Reformed 
theology, the psychological shock and horror of recognition are taken to compel 
the individual to accept its unworthiness, and to expect salvation only through the 
grace of God. In his chapter of the role of ‘fantasy’ in Protestant literature in 
Protestantism and Drama, Adrian Streete has analysed the mechanisms through 
which the fantasy, cut loose from its representational shackles, becomes constitu-
tive of subjectivity. At the heart of these concerns, Streete argues, is not so much 
intromission, but ‘extramission’, the mechanism through which the idols of the 
mind take form in the outside world; the way in which igurative images appear to 
become ‘invested with a degree of ontological truth’.44 ‘Originary worthiness and 
present unworthiness are the essential components of the Calvinist dialectic. It is 
only through this struggle between “primal worthiness” and present “foulness” that 
“abhorrence” comes about: subjectivity is mimetically produced by confronting 
the memory of an originary worthiness now perceived as primary lack, humility 
and the desire for grace.’45
While Greville’s account of the imagination’s productive powers no doubt 
 ultimately derives from his Calvinist beliefs, even there where his language and 
ideas show a demonstrable inluence of Stoicism, it was an altogether diferent 
tradition that furnished him with the conceptual vocabulary to analyse its operation, 
and to examine the dynamics of extramission. he love poetry in Greville’s Caelica, 
as I shall argue in the second part of this chapter, scrutinizes the link between the 
imaginative faculty and the creation of ictions. Greville here appears to draw from 
a diferent strand of ideas deriving from Renaissance rhetoric and poetics which, 
with perverse pleasure, turns against itself to expose the erotic entanglement of the 
mind in ictions of its own making.
Centaurs of the Mind: Desire, Poesis, and Erotic Fixation
he suspicion about the imaginative faculty that we have traced in the body of 
literature discussed above, and which indeed, in various shades and nuances is 
43 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, I.7.7.
44 Adrian Streete, Protestantism and Drama in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), ch. 4, ‘Perception and fantasy in early modern Protestant discourse’, 110–26, 113.
45 Streete, Protestantism and Drama, 91.
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shared between authors as diferent in other respects as Calvin and Charron exer-
cised a powerful inluence of the culture of the later Renaissance. It was, however, 
by no means the only intellectual resource available. While both the gradual  erosion 
of the certainties of faculty psychology, the rise of Neostoic theories of mind, and 
the revival of an Augustinian anthropology of original sin and grace all contributed 
to downgrade the imagination, or at least to highlight its dangers, the Renaissance 
revival of Neoplatonism, as well as new developments in Renaissance rhetoric and 
poetics both allowed for a positive, and indeed enthusiastic  appreciation of the 
imagination’s powers.
he work of the Florentine Neoplatonist Marsilio Ficino played a deining role 
in shaping Renaissance theories of love, inspiration, and divine furor. While Ficino 
was not an enthusiast of the imagination, ranking it irmly below the rational 
 powers of the mind, elements of his work, particularly his celebration of the cre-
ative powers of man in the eighth book of heologia platonica, would contribute to 
later theoretization of the link between the imagination and artistic creativity.46 
Drawing back on the ideas of Proclus, moreover, Renaissance Neoplatonism recast 
the imagin ation as a mediating faculty through which angelic powers transmitted 
insights in the form of images.47 In the work of Ficino, images are often hyposta-
tized: ‘hey become substantial, having the same substance as the astral body and 
the heavenly bodies, and are the mediators through which mind can act on matter 
by bringing to bear on them the vis imaginativa.48
While the exact nature and extent of the inluence of Neoplatonic ideas on late 
Elizabethan culture is controversial, the cosmopolitan and intellectually tolerant 
environment of the Leicester–Sidney circle appears at least to have been open to its 
inluence. Neoplatonic ideas furnished the intellectual foundation of the Hermetic 
and magical experiments of John Dee, whose connections to the Sidney family 
were particularly close, and who was for a time, tutor to both Sidney and, possibly, 
Greville.49 More controversially, Greville could have encountered these ideas 
through the igure of Giordano Bruno, the heterodox ex-friar from Nola, who 
dedicated two of his works to Sidney, and whose Cena delle Ceneri (1584) was set 
in Greville’s London residence.50 Bruno’s works such as De umbris idearum (1582) 
and Explicatio triginta sigillorum (1583) brought Neoplatonism’s communicative 
mental images to bear on Renaissance mnemotechnics. Following Proclus, Bruno 
employs these products of the imagination, replacing the ixed images of the art of 
memory (the images described as imagines agentes in the rhetorical tradition) with 
the mediating images that express the soul’s own dynamic powers.51
46 Cocking, Imagination, 168–94. 47 Cocking, Imagination, 173.
48 Cocking, Imagination, 181.
49 Peter J. French, John Dee: he World of an Elizabethan Magus (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1972) ch. 6, ‘John Dee and the Sidney Circle’, 126–49.
50 On Greville and Bruno, see the contribution of Fabio Raimondi in Chapter 9 of this volume.
51 Alessandro G. Farinella and Carole Preston, ‘Giordano Bruno: Neoplatonism and the Wheel of 
Memory in the De Umbris Idearum’, Renaissance Quarterly 55.2 (2002): 596–624, 599. Bruno’s Art of 
Memory is discussed more extensively in Frances Yates’s classic he Art of Memory. Frances A. Yates, 
he Art of Memory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966).
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Probably less controversial, and certainly more inluential, would have been the 
account of imagination in Renaissance rhetorical and poetical treatises. As Peter Mack 
has demonstrated, from about the 1580s onwards, these manuals and  handbooks 
begin to evince a distinctly more positive evaluation of the imaginative  faculty.52 
his development can be traced back to the rediscovery of the rhetorical and poet-
ical treatises of late Antiquity, such as Quintilian’s Instiutio Oratoria, Longinus’s 
Peri Hypsous, and Philostratus’s Life of Appolonius of Tyana, in whose work the clas-
sical, technical-philosophical concept of phantasia had irst come to be used in a 
wider sense to denote something like the creative powers of the mind.53 All three 
works use the term in a loose manner to describe both the mental faculty and the 
images it creates. Quintilian discusses phantasia in book VI of the Institutio oratoria 
in a passage directly following his discussion of the mimetic nature of the emo-
tions, and immediately before discussing enargeia:
he person who will show the greatest power in the expression of emotions will be the 
person who has properly formed what the Greeks call phantasiai (let us call them 
‘visions’), by which the images of absent things are presented to the mind in such a 
way that we seem actually to see them with our eyes and have them physically present 
to us. Some use the word euphantasiōtos of one who is exceptionally good at  realistically 
imagining to himself things, words, and actions. We can indeed easily make this 
 happen at will. When the mind is idle or occupied with wishful thinking or a sort of 
daydreaming, the images of which I am speaking haunt us, and we think we are travel-
ling or sailing or ighting a battle or addressing a crowd or disposing of wealth which 
we do not possess, and not just imagining but actually doing these things! Can we not 
turn this mental vice to a useful purpose? Surely we can.
From this capacity, Quintilian argues, arises ‘enargeia, what Cicero calls illustratio 
and evidentia, a quality which makes us seem not so much to be talking about 
something as exhibiting it. Emotions will ensue just as if we were present at the 
event itself ’.54
Longinus’s treatment of phantasia has elements in common with that of 
Quintilian, although he distinguishes its efects in rhetoric (enargeia) from its 
efects in poetry (ekplexis). He deines phantasia, moreover, not so much as facility 
that can be trained but as one of the hallmarks of the sublime, describing how it 
occurs when ‘carried away by inspiration and emotion, you think you see what you 
describe and you place it before the eyes of the hearers.’55 A text like Puttenham’s 
52 Peter Mack, ‘Early Modern Ideas of Imagination: the Rhetorical Tradition’, in Nauta and 
Pätzold, Imagination, 59–76, 72–5.
53 Gerard Watson, Phantasia in Classical hought (Galway: Galway University Press, 1988), ch. 4, 
‘he transformation of phantasia’, 59–95, 59.
54 Quintilian, he Orator’s Education, Volume III: Books 6–8, ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 6.2.26–32, 58–61.
55 Longinus, On Style, in Aristotle: Poetics. Longinus: On the Sublime. Demetrius: On Style, 
trans. Stephen Halliwell, W. Hamilton Fyfe, Doreen C. Innes, and W. Rhys Roberts. Revised by 
Donald A. Russell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 15, 214–17. On Longinus in 
the Renaissance, see Eugenio Reini, ‘Longinus and Poetic Imagination in Late Renaissance Literary 
heory’, in Translations of the Sublime. he Early Modern Reception and Dissemination of Longinus’ Peri 
Hupsous in Rhetoric, the Visual Arts, Architecture and the heatre (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 33–53.
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Arte of English Poetry draws from this tradition, echoing Quintilian’s remarks on 
the man of capacious imagination, but claiming, if anything, even wider scope 
for the powers of the fantasy:
Wherefore, such persons as be illuminated with the brightest irradiations of  knowledge 
and of the verity and due proportion of things, they are called by the learned men not 
phantastikoi but euphantasiōtoi, and of this sort of fantasy are all good poets, notable 
captains stratagematic, all cunning artiicers and legislaters, politicians and counsellors 
of estate, in whose exercises the inventive part is most employed and is to the sound 
and true judgement of man most needful.56
Nor did phantasia’s triumph end there. Philostratus’s Life of Apollonius of Tyana 
argues for the superiority of phantasia over mimesis (here conceived narrowly as the 
imitation of nature, rather than as mimesis in the Aristotelian sense) in a phrase that 
seems to be echoed on Sidney’s comparison between the ‘narrow warrant of nature’s 
gifts’, and the ‘zodiac’ of the poet’s wit: Phantasia is more skilled craftsman than 
mimesis. ‘For mimesis will produce only what she has seen, but phantasia even what she 
has not seen as well; and she will produce it referring to the standard of the perfect 
reality.’57 his positive evaluation of phantasia eventually found its way back into 
faculty-psychological treatises. When Bishop Edward Reynolds, in most other respects 
an unsuspected Calvinist, discusses the imagination in his Treatise of the Passions 
and Faculties of the Soul of Man (1629) he sounds closer to Sidney than Calvin.
. . .  for reason and all other powers, have their ixed and determined limits in nature, 
and therefore they always frame themselves to the truth of things, yielding assent to 
nothing but what they inde: But imagination is a faculty boundless, and impatient of 
any imposed limits, save those which it selfe maketh. And hence it is that in matter of 
persuasion and insinuation, Poetrie, Mythologie, and Eloquence, (the arts of rationall 
fancie have ever, (as was observed) beene more forcible than those which have been 
rigorously grounded on Nature and Reason: it being, as Scaliger observes, the natural 
ininiteness of man’s Soule, aspernari artorum inium praescriptionem, to disdaine any 
bound and conines in her operations.58
Indeed, according to Reynolds, it is because of the fact that the imagination is 
unlimited, that we can conceive God at all. And yet it is not autonomous power of 
the fantasy which allows man to comprehend the godhead, but divine accommo-
dation. In order that we may ‘see’ God in his Word, Calvin writes, the Bible speaks 
to us in igural language. It employs metaphor, symbols, parables, and similitudes, 
‘whereby heavenly doctrines are shadowed forth, and do condiscend unto human 
frailties’.59 It is then perhaps not coincidental that Greville returns to an image of 
poetic creativity to trace the genesis of idolatry:
Who those characteristicall Ideas
Conceives, which Science of the Godhead be? 
But in their stead we raise, and mould Trophaes 
56 Puttenham, he Arte of English Poesy, (Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 1970), I.8.
57 Watson, Phantasia in Classical hought, 63, compare Sidney, Defence 9.
58 Edward Reynolds, A Treatise of the Passions and the Faculties of the Soul of Man [1640] (Gainsville, 
Florida: Scholars’ Facsimiles and Reprints, 1971), p 24.
59 Reynolds, A Treatise of the Passions, 21.
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Formes of Opinion, Wit and Vanity, 
Which we call Arts, and fall in love with these, 
As did Pygmalion with his carved tree; 
For which men, all the life they here enjoy 
Still Fight, as for the Helens of their Troy
(Treatie of Humane Learning, 25)
Greville’s espousal of a Platonic vocabulary of ideas and forms here signals the 
 diiculty inherent in the kind of imaginative transcendence beloved of the 
Neoplatonists. His account inverts the traditional interpretation of the myth of 
Pygmalion as an allegory of poesis, the creative, god-like power of the artist (and by 
extension, the poet) and, all the while poignantly demonstrating the poet’s own 
imaginative debt to Ovid, turns it into a iction of artistic impotence, emphasized 
in the choice of the iconoclastic ‘carved tree’ for Ovid’s ivory statue of Galatea. 
Greville’s use of Ovid’s story is, it has to be admitted, not entirely novel. Indeed, 
as  early as Jean de Meung’s continuation of the Roman de la Rose, the story of 
Pygmalion igures as an example of the idolatrous nature of courtly love.60 Yet 
what is important here, I believe, is that in Greville’s literary environment, in the 
work of Neoplatonists such as Bruno, or those at least inluenced by its philosophy, 
such as Spenser, Samuel Daniel, and, to some extent Philip Sidney, metamorphosis 
igures as an allegory of erotic or spiritual transformation.61 Greville, in a way that 
is perhaps closer to Petrarch’s own use of the Ovidian material, uses the idea of 
metamorphosis as a metaphor for the alienation, self-division, and self-loss that 
follows misdirected love. he (faulty) powers of the imagination play a central role 
in Greville’s examination of the conventions of courtly love lyric. Caelica XXXVII 
igures a captive Cupid, who has been thrown into a well, and a lover hoping to 
employ the winged god’s services to conquer the Lady’s chastity:
his was the cause, he said, made him complain; 
He swears, if I help him, to help me again; 
And straightways ofers me. 
If virtue conquered be. 
Beauty and pleasure free, joy without pain. 
I glad, not for pity, but hope of the prize. 
And proud of this language from Caelica’s eyes. 
hrew of my liberty. Hoping that blessed I 
Shall with sweet Cupid ly in beauty’s skies.
But when in my heart I had pieced his bow. 
And on the air of my thoughts made his wings go. 
60 Nicolette Zeeman, ‘he Idol of the Text’, in Images, Idolatry and Iconoclasm, ed. Dimmock, 
Simpson, and Zeeman, 43–62, 55–8.
61 On Neoplatonism see Robert Ellrodt, Neoplatonism in the Poetry of Spenser (Folcroft, Pa., 
Folcroft Press, 1969); Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton, Plato and the English Imagination (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994); Verena Olejniczak Lobsien, Transparency and Dissimulation: 
Conigurations of Neoplatonism in Early Modern English Literature (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012). On 
Sidney and Bruno, see David Farley Hills, ‘he “Argomento” of Bruno’s De gli eroici furori and Sidney’s 
Astrophil and Stella’, in MLR 87.1 (1992): 1–17; Parker, ‘Philip Sidney and Proportional Form: 
Astrophil and Stella, Certaine Sonets, and Bruno’s De gli eroici furori’, in Parker, Proportional Form; 
Hillary Gatti, ‘Petrarch, Sidney, Bruno’, in Hillary Gatti, Essays on Giordano Bruno (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011), 115–26.
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he little lad fears the rod, He is not there a god, 
I and delight are odd; Myra says “no.” 
he lint keepeth ire, the lad he says true, 
But bellows, it will not be kindled by you; 
He that takes stars with staves. 
Yet hath not all he craves. 
Love is not his that raves; hope is untrue.
To fully grasp the import of Greville’s satire, it is necessary to understand how the 
poetic conceit of love travelling through the beams emitted by the eye derived from 
medieval and Renaissance theories of vision, and needs in fact to understood as an 
concrete, physical process.62 he problems and dangers inherent in this transaction 
had been explored by many a sonneteer, not in the last instance by Petrarch him-
self, yet in this poem, the lover’s perplexity is compounded by a troubling loss of 
agency, and sense of the shifting or dissolution of the boundaries between subject 
and object. Nothing, obviously, quite works as it should here. Love appears to 
dwell in Myra’s eyes but is evidently not doing a particularly good job, so the lover 
calls him back and reassembles him to launch another attack. Love, rather than 
being a dynamic force that has the potential, at least, to transcend through the 
material to spiritual, here seems to be consubstantial with the lover; made from his 
own desires and imaginations: ‘But when in my heart I had pieced his bow./ And 
on the air of my thoughts made his wings go.’ With sardonic relish Greville literal-
izes the poetic conceit of Cupid travelling through the beams of the eye so as to 
make the lover’s ixations redound on himself: ‘he little lad fears the rod/ He is 
not there a god/ I and Delight are odd/ Myra says “no”’.
While the tone of the poem is humorous, even bantering, it nevertheless serves to 
make a serious point that courtly love is a ixation, a form of idolatry, and all the more 
nefarious for being, ultimately, a product of self-love. At the same time, the imagin-
ation, while spiritually barren, is an irreducibly productive faculty, and the fantasies 
it creates have efects in the world, in spite of their falsity. Yet because the imagina-
tion’s creations are, psychologically, the products of self-love, they are by deinition 
unstable, and interminable. Caelica 42 conveys the radical sense of fragmentation 
that follows:
Pelius that loth was hetis to forsake 
Had counsell from the Gods to hold her fast 
Fore-warn’d what lothsome likenesse she would take,
Yet, if he held come to her selfe at last. 
He held; the snakes, serpents and the ire, 
No monsters prov’d, but travells of desire
When I beheld how Caelica’s fair eyes, 
Did show her heart to some, her Wit to me, 
Change that doth prove the error, is not wise. 
In her mishap made me strange visions see; 
62 On the physics of seeing in Renaissance image theory and painting, see Christian Kleinbub, 
‘ “To Sow the Heart”: Touch, Spiritual Anatomy, and Image heory in Michelangelo’s “Noli me tangere” ’, 
Renaissance Quarterly 66.1 (2013): 81–129.
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Desire held fast, till love’s unconstant zone.  
Like Gorgon’s head transformed her heart to stone
From stone she turns again into a cloud. 
Where water still had more power than the ire, 
And I poor Ixion to my Juno vowed 
With thoughts to clip her, clipped my own desire; 
For she was vanished, I held nothing fast. 
But woes to come and joys already past.
his cloud straight makes a stream, in whose smooth face 
While I the image of myself did glass, 
hought-shadows I for beauty did embrace. 
Till stream and all except the cold did pass; 
Yet faith held fast like foils where stones be set, 
To make toys dear and fools more fond to get.
hus our Delights, like faire shapes in a glasse, 
hough pleasing to our senses cannot last, 
he metall breaks, or else the Visions passe 
Onely our griefs in constant moulds are cast  
I’ll hold no more, false Caelica, live free; 
Seeme faire to all the world, and foule to me.
he opening lines of the poem lead us in to a dense labyrinth of Ovidian and 
Petrarchan allusions, recalling not one but several stories from Ovid’s Metamorphoses: 
Peleus and hetis, Niobe, Ixion, Narcissus, and Echo. Greville’s poem seems to 
echo Canzone XXIII of Petrarch’s Rime sparse, a long poem known as the Canzone 
delle metamorfosi. In the poem, which can be read as a commentary and interpret-
ation on the Canzoniere as a whole, the narrative of the poet’s love is described as a 
series of transformations: he becomes a laurel, like Daphne, until his lady’s cruelty 
turns him, Medusa-like, into stone, and so on, and on, until, like Echo, he is 
reduced to nothing but voice: ‘I nervi et l’ossa/ Mi volse in dura selce, et cosi scossa / 
voce rimase de l’antiche some / Chiamando  Morte e le sola per nome.’63 In 
Greville’s poem, by contrast, it is the mistress who is turned into stone, a reversal 
of the erotic dynamic of the Pygmalion story, and a making literal of the conceit of 
the Lady as idol. Her second alteration, from stone to cloud, evokes the seventh 
book of the Metamorphoses, which tells the story of how Ixion, king of the Lapiths, 
attempted to rape Juno. Instead of the goddess, he embraced her shape in the form 
of a cloud, and as punishment for his crime Jupiter sentenced him to be bound to 
a iery, eternally rotating wheel.64 From the union with the cloud, Centauros was 
born, father of the race of the Centaurs. Greville unpacks the well-known story 
until it supplies him with several separate metaphors. he rotating iery wheel 
occurs several times in Greville’s poetry and plays as a igure for the sinful mind, 
yet here it is clearly the metaphor of embracing a cloud that holds his fascination. 
63 ‘She turned my sinews and my bones into hard lint, and thus I remained a voice shaken from 
my former burden, calling death and only her by name’. Petrarch, Rime sparse, xxiii, 137–40.
64 Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. Frank Justus Miller (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 
1984 [1916]), IV, 61 and IX, 124; on the cloud form see XII, 504. See also Greville, A Letter to an 
Honourable Lady, 142–3.
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Intriguingly, the Ixion story igures in a similar way in Bacon’s Advancement of 
Learning as a warning against the ‘vaporous’ imagination.65
Yet throughout the poem imaginative processes and fantasies are rendered in 
the strongly physical, erotic language of grasping, clipping, and embracing. he 
ontological status of cloud of desire may be in doubt, but, like the centaurs it spawns, 
it has a reality of its own. Here, as in other places, Greville’s uses of the word 
‘shadows’ denote things of diminished ontological reality; imaginary constructs, 
relections of relections, which, like Narcissus’s mirror-image, relects the self back 
unto itself. More similar to the apparitions in he Terrors of the Night than to 
Bruno’s ‘shadows of the ideas’, Greville’s thought-shadows are simultaneously real 
and wholly insubstantial.
Greville’s use of the Ovidian material is fragmentary, stripping the stories to 
their core, and employing them as loosely connected metaphors, which transform 
into new metaphors. he result is jarring and discordant and resembling something 
akin in efect, even though not in form, to metalepsis.66 In these poems about failed 
communication, the efect is of course deliberate, with Greville using the idea of 
metamorphosis as a igure for the processes of objectivation and projection that 
guide the boundary traic between the lover’s imagination and the mistress as 
object of desire.
Many of the Caelica poems that chart the vagaries of desire have a philosophical, 
speculative tenor and are solemn, even dark in tone. Yet this is by no means neces-
sarily the case. Sonnet 56, for instance, satirizes the Neoplatonic idea central to the 
theory of the ascent of love, that the idea of Beauty can be instantiated, even 
though only imperfectly, in human form. he poet-lover sees his lady asleep, ‘naked 
on a bed of play’, and is transported into increasingly grandiose erotic fantasies: he 
is Mars, and she is Venus; or perhaps he is Apollo, and she is Aurora, or better still, 
he is Jupiter, and she is Juno. Yet while his tumescent imagination runs away with 
him, Cynthia’s body turns into water and slips away, escaping his embrace:
here stand I, like Articke pole, here Sol passeth o‘re the line, 
Mourning my benighted soule, 
Which so loseth light divine 
here stand I like Men that preach 
From the execution place 
At their death content to teach 
All the world with their disgrace: 
He that lets his Cynthia lye, 
Naked on a bed of play 
To say prayers ere she dye, 
Teacheth time to runne away: 
Let no Love-desiring heart, 
65 Francis Bacon, he Advancement of Learning, ed. Michael Kiernan, he Oxford Francis Bacon IV 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 12.
66 Brian Cummings, ‘Metalepsis: he Boundary of Metaphor’, in Renaissance Figures of Speech, ed. 
Sylvia Adamson, Gavin Alexander, and Katrin Ettenhuber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
217–34.
0004145987.INDD   116 7/13/2018   6:26:29 PM
Dictionary: NOSD
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 13/07/18, SPi
 Imagination and Fiction-making in the Work of Fulke Greville 117
In the Starres goe seeke his fate 
Love is only Natures art, 
Wonder hinders Love and Hate. 
None can well behold with eyes, 
But what underneath him lies
More is at stake here, though, than humour alone. As Greville’s erotic poetry raises 
questions about the relationship between the imagination, iction, and desire, it 
also exploits the resources of poetry to explore the ontological status of the mental 
image and its relation to the outside world. Greville employs the idea of metamor-
phosis, using it as technique of fragmentation in which transformation does not 
mark an ending but sets into motion what seems to be a potentially  indeterminable 
process. Erotic love thus becomes one of the lenses through which Greville views 
the paradox of the inite ininite, in which the restless, endless movement and striv-
ing becomes the sign of an ontological loss, of the soul’s defection from an original 
state of greater perfection, and of its yearning for its origins.
It is here that the Augustinian streak in Greville’s psychology is most pronounced. 
Although the poems never develop a formal opposition, there is a strong sense in 
which both erotic and divine love are species of desiderium, yet only divine love, ‘a 
simple goodness in the lesh rein’d’, (Caelica LXXXV) truly inds its object and 
leads to enjoyment. he fact that Greville sees idolatry as inextricably bound up 
with our thought processes might incline one to see his poetic as a form of ‘inner 
iconoclasm’; a process of relentless self-examination and inner puriication that 
obliged the believer, ‘to act the iconoclast on the idol-processes of his mind’.67 And 
yet this would be to fundamentally misunderstand the intent of these poems. For 
as Guagliardo argues in Chapter 13 of this volume ‘while Greville discovers human 
nature’s “ancient forming powers” behind the cracked ediice of the idol, he denies 
that acting on these powers will save us from idolatry’.68 Greville’s view of art is, 
Guagliardo points out, riven by a fundamental paradox that it is both the measure 
and limit of our alienation. Greville’s slippery Galatea metaphorizes the erotics of 
idolatry by highlighting the element of self-love that makes the  imagination fall in 
love with its own creations. he idea the arts might be able to restore our fall, or 
that we could have a form of worship other than one that is ‘mixt of base thoughts 
and sublime;/ Of native evill, supernaturall good/ Truth born of God, and error of 
our blood’ (TR, LI) turns out to be yet another idolatrous iction. Only grace can 
transcend the lesh, and Greville’s poetry efects, it has been noticed, a dual move-
ment, an intellectual double-take, both away from the lesh, and back towards it.69 
Greville’s superb debunking of the literary conventions of courtly love then turns 
out to be a markedly double-edged sword. By debasing idealizing love and placing 
it back into the realm of nature, time, and change, Greville not merely orients the 
67 Aston, England’s Iconoclasts, 461.
68 While I agree with Guagliardo about the paradoxical status of art in Greville’s work, and share 
his analysis of what he terms the dialectic of idolatry, I disagree with his interpretation of this dialectic 
as anti-religious, or even anti-Calvinist. See Ethan Guagliardo’s ‘“hese Ancient Forming Powers”: 
Fulke Greville’s Dialectic of Idolatry’, Chapter 13 in this volume.
69 Gunn, 166.
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subject towards divine love, he also opens up a space, no matter however slight, for 
love as ‘nature’s art’. By demystifying courtly love, Greville efectively frees up a 
space for love as ‘nature’s art’, a love that is free from stiling conventions and from 
the straightjacket of ictions which are mere externalizations of mental ixations. 
Love, Greville knows as a good Calvinist, is not won through virtuous merit, service, 
or self-abnegation, quite the contrary: ‘Desert is borne out of his bowe/ Reward 
upon his wing doth goe;’. Indeed those who believe they can merit love through 
their virtue spoil the fun, and lose their chances:
Away with these self-loving Lads, 
whom Cupids arrow never glads: 
Away poore soues that sigh and weep, 
In love of those that lye asleepe, 
For Cupid is a meadow-God, 
And forceth none to kisse the rod
Love, Greville argues, is by nature free and impatient of constraints: ‘What fooles 
are they that have not knowne,/ hat Love likes no Lawes but owne’ (Caelica LII)). 
For Greville’s insistence on love’s fundamental autonomy also, at times, can be taken 
to mean that it is, in last resort, at least free from the conventions and constraints 
of social life, free that is, to and for all: ‘And love as well thee foster can,/ As can the 
mighty Noble-man’. If love is indeed nothing more than a game of chance, then at 
least everyone stands an equal chance of winning.
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